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Abstract
To address the reallocation of tasks and responsibilities of police officers regarding mental health
crises in recent years, a variety of response programs have been employed and investigated. Such
programs like Crisis Intervention Teams (CIT) and Co-Response Teams (CRT) have been
examined in prior literature. However, the current study aimed to examine programs utilizing a
third approach: the Community Response Program (CPR) method as utilized by CAHOOTS in
Springfield and Eugene, Oregon. These teams differ from the two previous methods as they do
not rely on police officer intervention as part of their default approach when responding to crisis
calls. A total of nine programs across the US utilizing this approach were identified and a content
analysis was conducted in order to compare the descriptions and information available of each
program website. Overall, there were inconsistencies regarding access and transparency of
information of the team compositions, the target populations served, data recorded, and clarity of
program goals. Further research regarding this approach may result in a more consistent baseline
or reference for CRPs that may increase subject success rates and positive outcomes after
interventions.
Keywords: Crisis intervention team, co-response team, community-based response,
community response program, crisis response program, crisis response unit, crisis intervention
methods
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Chapter 1
Crisis Intervention and Response Program Analysis
In order to reallocate the tasks and responsibilities police officers face, specifically in
response to recent calls to “defund the police”, alternative policing practices have been
examined. Particularly, collaboration or reassignment of tasks to other specialists, such as social
workers or mental health consultants, has become increasingly popular. This has become
prevalent regarding police interactions with individuals experiencing some type of mental health
crisis. In an effort to better equip police officers with more knowledge and training when
responding to mental health crisis calls, many departments have sought the use of a variety of
crisis response teams (Koziarski et al., 2021). As of 2008, there were over 400 different Crisis
Intervention Team (CIT) programs that were implemented within the United States (Compton et
al., 2008). These programs are based upon a specialized model implemented to train officers on
crisis intervention tactics, mediation, and de-escalation, only arresting the subject if no other
options seem plausible (Corcoran & Allen, 2005; Hacker & Horan, 2019). They are carried out
with over 40 hours of classroom instruction and experience using de-escalation tactics as they
may arise in different crises (Compton et al., 2008).
After the death of an individual with mental illness by a police officer in 1988 (Allen &
Campbell, 2018), this training was created to increase officers’ safety and the rates of successful
interactions when confronting people with mental illness (Compton et al., 2008; Koziarski et al.,
2021). The Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was used to describe the reasons why the death
occurred and offered ways to reduce the chances of similar situations (Allen & Campbell, 2018).
PMT is a framework that examines and measures how those in intervention situations or crises
react to variables involving threats or appraisals. For CITs, this theory was utilized to measure
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and eliminate threat appraisals in intervention situations by officers, as well as indicate that
successful interactions would act as a reward, thus providing reinforcement for behavior changes
(Allen & Campbell, 2018). Increased research and examination of such programs has been
crucial for further development as officers come into contact with people with mental illness six
times a month on average (Hacker & Horan, 2019). This need was further indicated as the
Washington County Sheriff’s Office (n.d.) in Oregon reported that in 2019, their crisis response
unit received over 4,800 crisis calls, thus demonstrating the large volume of crisis calls officers
respond to.
After this type of program and training was created, it gained popularity and has been
adopted in many agencies in an attempt to further assist police officers with mediation during
disputes. As a collaborative effort between law enforcement and mental health specialists, other
response models and teams have been implemented in some departments (Bailey et al., 2018;
Kirst et al., 2015). Aside from offering specialized training for police officers and agencies, CoResponse Teams (CRT), or mobile crisis units, have been studied to examine their performance
and effectiveness (Koziarski et al., 2021). These teams can offer specialized training for police
officers to educate them on mental health crises and place a mental health professional on patrol
with them to assist firsthand on crisis intervention calls. CRTs in some cases may also form
teams with an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) and a mental health specialist. The exact
composition and structure of these teams varies; however, they are consistent in that they have a
non-police officer individual placed with an officer in the response unit. The goal of this
approach is to assess the situation, de-escalate it, and refer to outside assistance if needed
(Compton et al., 2008).

CRISIS INTERVENTION PROGRAM ANALYSIS

3

As mental illness plays a part in many of these crisis calls (Harte, 2015), it is important to
examine the ways CIT and CRT implementation may affect how these interactions with police
occur (Mulvey & White, 2014). Researchers Mulvey and White (2014) reported that those with
mental illness have been found to have an increased likelihood of resistance against police
officers. However, there have been mixed results regarding use of force and severity of force
against individuals with mental illness (Mulvey & White, 2014). This is important to consider as
it suggests that after the implementation of a CIT or CRT program, police officers may view and
approach calls with mental illness more carefully, and thus, may be less likely to utilize force
against these individuals. Research has indicated that officers in other departments, after
implementation of CIT programs, reported more positive attitudes regarding the training they
had received (Morabito et al., 2013). Specifically, the officers who had a chance to use the CIT
skills they had developed regarded the program with more positive statements compared to other
officers (Morabito et al., 2013).
Aside from officers, community members have sought to utilize similar response
programs and units to assist their communities. One such program in Eugene, Oregon, is named
Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets (CAHOOTS; White Bird Clinic, n.d.). They act as
a mobile crisis response unit that is active 24/7 with an aim to stabilize, assess, and refer subjects
to other resources. The teams are comprised of a crisis worker, who has several years of
experience as a mental health specialist, and a nurse or EMT (Eugene Police Department, n.d.).
This program does not include police officers as a part of their initial team; instead, they call and
refer to the police as necessary if a crime has been committed or a life-threatening emergency
has taken place (White Bird Clinic, n.d.).
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While the CAHOOTS program utilizes teams which consist of volunteers without a
police officer, it should be noted that there is a gap in research when considering the structure of
crisis response teams and the effect that this structure may have on crisis response calls. In
particular, how subjects respond and cooperate in response to these teams has not been studied as
thoroughly compared to insights regarding these programs (Blevins et al., 2014; Kirst et al.,
2015; Strassle, 2019). Instead, prior research has examined officer perceptions of CIT and CRT
programs and training, as well as how arrest rates have been affected when these teams were in
place (Harte, 2015; Yang et al., 2018). Agreeability or cooperation as a response of those on the
receiving end of a crisis intervention method is an important variable to consider for crisis calls
as those who display more willingness to listen and cooperate may have lower arrest rates (Teller
et al., 2006; Young et al., 2008). In one study, researchers Corcoran and Allen (2005) found that
in CIT calls, 15% of those calls listed subjects as noncooperative. In comparison, the noncrisis
calls only experienced a total of 4% noncooperative subjects. Consequently, a review of
literature regarding CITs and CRTs was conducted to provide adequate background information
that led to the formation of Community Response Programs (CRP). The objective of the current
study was to analyze programs similar to CAHOOTS in order to identify CRPs that utilize teams
without police officers present.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Crisis Intervention Teams
Crisis intervention programs resulted from the theoretical framework derived from crisis
theory. As stated by Corcoran and Allen (2005), crisis theory indicated that, in order to increase
the chances of assisting individuals through crisis and with managing stress, intervention at a
crucial time is necessary. This was supported by Cacciatore et al. (2011) who stated that crisis
intervention needed to be precise and timely in order to be effective. When doing so, there would
be greater chances of preventing long-term negative symptoms for those experiencing crises
(Cacciatore et al., 2011). To increase these chances, the main principles of intervention within
crisis theory included providing aid quickly, allowing the subject to express feelings and
symptoms freely, and ensuring that short- and long-term social support is provided (Cacciatore et
al., 2011).
With these tenets of crisis theory and intervention acting as a foundation, current Crisis
Intervention Team (CIT) programs have largely focused on training police officers for
interactions that involve people with mental illness as well as guiding them on how to deescalate crisis situations (Hacker & Horan, 2019; Koziarski et al., 2021; Morabito et al., 2013).
In a study conducted by Compton et al. (2014), they found that officers with CIT training scored
better regarding their knowledge of mental health, crisis calls, available treatments, and felt more
confident overall in their skills when interacting with a subject who may be suffering from a
mental illness. Researchers (Compton et al., 2014) have also found that these officers had
significantly higher rates for de-escalation and referral procedures, signifying the benefits of the
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CIT training. These findings held true 22 months after the officers had completed their training,
indicating that the skills developed during this training period persisted (Compton et al., 2014).
In a similar manner, Teller and other researchers (2006) assessed the effects and
perceptions of officers implementing a CIT training program. The results suggested that while
the total amount of calls received did not increase, the number of calls credited as mental health
crises did. The researchers (Teller et al., 2006) reported that may have been due to the training
dispatch received, and thus, they may have been more likely to clearly identify which calls were
mental health related. As the program was implemented, those in the community may also have
been more likely to recognize if a situation could benefit from the CIT intervention and called
based on that fact (Morabito et al., 2013; Seo et al., 2020; Teller et al., 2006). This could suggest
that with program implementation, officers will be more confident in recognizing situations
related to mental health (Seo et al., 2020). This is similar to Morabito and their team’s (2013)
findings which suggested that officers who had utilized their skills developed from training were
more likely to hold positive views regarding the program, as well as hold favorable beliefs about
practical use of these skills.
It has also been reported that how officers are introduced to the training program is
important (Compton et al., 2017; Compton et a., 2011). Findings indicated that officers who
volunteered for CIT training, rather than being assigned to it, had higher levels of education,
attitudes towards those with mental illness, and reported better implementation of skills
regarding crisis calls. While the officers who volunteered were more likely to use some type of
physical force during these interactions, such as using handcuffs, when doing so, they were more
likely to refer the subject to a treatment center as opposed to arresting them (Compton et al.,
2017). In an earlier study, the researchers (Compton et al., 2011) also found that officers who
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volunteered for CIT training were twice as likely to have prior exposure or experience with
mental health professionals to some degree. This indicated that a possible interest or empathetic
mindset from volunteer officers may provide valuable benefits for CIT groups. Aside from these
findings, there has been little else examining self-selection or volunteering as a variable
regarding CIT training effectiveness. Further investigating this may yield benefits for larger
departments with a wider array of officers, especially when deciding if teams should be
comprised of all volunteer officers, assigned officers, or a mixture of both (Compton et al., 2017,
Compton et al., 2011).
As discussed earlier, how these officers and other involved parties view these programs
has been previously studied. Prior findings indicated that officers, police chiefs, and other
stakeholders overall felt that the training programs provided officers with necessary tools and
skills when dealing with crisis calls (Compton et al., 2008; Kirst et al., 2015; Seo et al., 2020). In
rural areas specifically, Strassle (2019), Yang et al. (2018), and Compton et al. (2008) noted that
officers reported feeling less anxiety when responding to calls related to mental health crises.
They stated that the CIT training improved their knowledge, resulting in a positive impact on
their attitudes and beliefs (Strassle, 2019). Those who received CIT training also reported feeling
significantly more confident when responding to crisis calls than officers who did not receive the
training (Borum et al., 1998; Teller et al., 2006). In terms of effectiveness of these programs, it
was found that officers with CIT training, compared to untrained officers, were more likely to
transport subjects to a separate facility or hospital instead of arresting them (Teller et al., 2006).
There was also a significant increase in voluntary transport from the subjects interacting with
CITs or CRTs. This demonstrated the importance of de-escalation for compliance and voluntary
actions regarding the subjects (Teller et al., 2006).
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These findings of positive perceptions held by law enforcement were in direct contrast to
previous findings which implied, despite being appreciative of the training received, officers
were still frustrated by current practices and resources available (Yang et al., 2018). Despite the
fact that CIT programs have been heavily implemented in recent years (Compton et al., 2010;
Compton et al., 2008), there was still some dissatisfaction among related parties regarding
current training and options available when dealing with individuals in crisis. While urban areas
may have at least one designated emergency mental health facility, the availability of these
facilities was not guaranteed in rural areas, thus creating barriers for proper implementation of
CIT programs (Compton et al., 2010).
Appropriate and proper implementation was another factor that was previously discussed
regarding how to effectively utilize CIT programs. As Yang and other researchers (2018)
examined how mental health calls were previously handled, they found that overall, calls related
to mental health took significantly longer than other calls. Based on this finding, it was suggested
that targeted program application would be beneficial to lessen the time resolving these issues
(Yang et al., 2018). This was confirmed in a prior study (Compton et al., 2010) where inadequate
training policies and protocols as performed by dispatchers contributed to officer frustration. As
dispatchers are the first line of interaction, appropriate training and referral from their side was
thought to greatly contribute to a more cohesive or effective result of crisis calls (Compton et al.,
2010).
Aside from the dissatisfaction with dispatcher training, officers also reported feeling
frustrated by quick release of subjects from emergency psychiatric facilities. This was attributed
to a lack of designated facilities with no-refusal policies, meaning that subjects were likely to be
released in a quick turn-around time (Compton et al., 2010). Even though officers reported
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feeling appreciative of their CIT training, they overall were still dissatisfied with the options and
resources available to them when responding to mental health calls (Yang et al., 2018). To
address the problem of staffing availability, response time, and appropriate referral practices,
other intervention group strategies have also been investigated.
Co-Response Teams
To further explore how CITs and training programs can be useful in aiding individuals in
crisis, Co-Response Teams (CRT), or mobile crisis units, have been examined previously
(Daggenvoorde et al., 2017; Kirst et al., 2015; Young et al., 2008). These teams were created
with a combination of police officers and mental health specialists of some kind (Koziarski et al.,
2021). In some programs, these teams either conducted patrols on certain weeknights (Young et
al., 2008), or waited for dispatch by the involved agency (Kirst et al., 2015). The teams reported
that 68% of the calls they responded to resulted in crisis counseling (Young et al., 2008), and
other duties included assisting the subject with suicidal thoughts, instances of self-harm,
delusional thinking, and other complications (Kirst et al., 2015). An evaluation of one of these
CRTs was conducted in order to examine the strengths, challenges, and barriers the program
faced (Kirst et al., 2015). They found that involved parties felt the program was effective in
meeting its goals in preventing undue hospitalization, and thus, aided individuals in crisis.
Variations in team structure and responsibility before, during, and after calls have briefly
been discussed or examined in prior research (Bailey et al., 2018; Kirst et al., 2015). Some of
these CRTs or response models consisted of CIT trained officers, mental health clinicians, and
paramedics (Bailey et al., 2018), while other units consisted of police officers and mental health
nurses that were dispatched by police communication service departments (Kirst et al., 2015). In
particular, CRTs in which mental health specialists interacted with subjects after being
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dispatched or paged found that involved parties held favorable views of the practices. The
researchers (Young et al., 2008) also found that officers were free to respond to other calls as the
team stayed behind. These models reported that subjects who received assistance felt supported
and safe. As the focus of these programs was to divert subjects away from hospitalization or
criminalization, they felt they were being supported while in crisis as opposed to being treated
like a criminal (Kirst et al., 2015).
This follows similar findings by Young and their research team (2008) who stated that
96% of subjects who received help from the CRT found the unit to be either helpful or extremely
helpful. The subjects who received assistance from these units described the team as concerned,
caring, supportive, and focused (Young et al., 2008). This indicated that most of the subjects held
favorable views regarding the team. This is consistent with research conducted by Daggenvoorde
et al. (2017) who found that “calmness… empathy… and understanding” (p. 467) from the
intervention team was greatly appreciated by the subjects and their family members. These
favorable responses are important as they may reflect how effective these programs may be at
interacting with those with mental illness.
Corcoran and Allen (2005) found that, when comparing crisis and non-crisis calls for
CRTs, rates of noncooperation were higher in crisis calls (15% in crisis calls vs 4% in noncrisis
calls). The researchers (Corcoran & Allen, 2005) indicated that a reason for this significant
difference was likely due to the very nature of crisis calls, and the fact that these subjects were
more likely to be under stress than the subjects in the non-crisis calls. Daggenvoorde et al. (2017)
reported that patients felt trapped during these situations, which resulted in difficult
communication between them and the team. Police involvement in these situations was viewed
as intrusive by the subjects, but also as difficult to watch by family members who were present
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(Daggenvoorde et al., 2017). Some of these patients reported that when police intervened with
the CRTs or mobile response units, they felt they were being treated as criminals who were being
brought into police custody while receiving assessment from the team. These reports are
significant when considering ways to increase rates of agreeability and cooperation among
subjects, and thus the team structure utilized should be further investigated.
Other factors to consider for proper implementation of CRTs included the collaboration
and work relationship among officers and the other team members. Officer dissatisfaction in
previous studies had been listed as one possible barrier for effective application of CRTs (Harte,
2015). One such factor included the chance of stigma or feelings of ostracization by officers
during and after training (Bailey et al., 2018; Kirst et al., 2015). Combined with role conflict and
misaligned goals, stigma was included as a suggested factor that inhibited effective collaboration
between law enforcement and mental health specialists (Bailey et al., 2018; Harte, 2015). The
officers felt ostracized by other first responders (Bailey et a., 2018), and this was consistent with
other findings which found that officers and team members from the health field felt distanced
from each other (Harte, 2015; Kirst et al., 2015). It was suggested that utilizing a collaborative
method between the agencies that rewarded non-traditional training, approaches, and creativity
would lessen stigma (Bailey et al., 2018; Harte, 2015). It was also advised that in order to further
support these collaborative environments, role clarity should be increased among groups to
improve partner cohesiveness (Compton et al., 2010; Kirst et al., 2015). A combination of
reward systems and role clarity may result in more effective partnerships.
Multiple studies also found that one of the main limitations included a lack of consistency
or a vague guideline on what calls were classified as mental health related (Bailey et al., 2018;
Blevins et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2018). There was also a lack of data concerning CIT or CRT
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calls due to a variety of reasons, such as incomplete data records from officers and issues with
follow-up data regarding subjects (Blevins et al., 2014). Teams encountered confusion with the
procedures in place and this interfered with their abilities to carry out job tasks effectively
(Bailey et al., 2018).
This was further supported by Blevins and other researchers (2014) where it was
suggested that there should be consistent guidelines in place to distinguish the characteristics of
mental-health related calls, and which would warrant the dispatch of a crisis response unit. In the
same study, it was also recommended that the use of field supervisors be included in future CIT
and CRT studies to oversee report completion (Blevins et al., 2014). Other research has also
suggested that, even for departments that implemented CITs or CRTs, the lack of a 24-hour team
or model set in place acted as a major obstacle in mental health or crisis calls (Koziarski et al.,
2021). This was due to the fact that during hours where there were no crisis response teams
available, frontline police officers without CIT training or CRT member support responded to
calls that would have been categorized as a mental health crisis during other hours (Koziarski et
al., 2021). The use of volunteers and self-selected officers, mental health specialists, and other
trained individuals to form teams to respond at different scheduled hours throughout the day or
night was suggested as a possible solution.
Community Response Programs
Alternative program and training options emerged from the resulting challenges CITs and
CRTs faced when interacting with people in crisis. From this need, communities have expressed
a desire for intervention or response programs, whether they were police- or community-led
(Jennings et al., 2015). In a case study examining a community-based trauma response team, the
researchers found that the volunteers worked with police, healthcare organizations, and other
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emergency responders in order to address the high rates of gang violence in their communities
(Jennings et al., 2015). While experiencing many limitations regarding funding and volunteer
expertise, the trauma response team was associated with a reduction in homicide cases and
injuries related to gang violence (Jennings et al., 2015).
Despite having no direct ties to mental health related interventions, this type of
Community Response Program (CRP) may show promise if adapted appropriately for other
types of responses. This is important to consider as there was significantly less research
published that examined crisis response teams without a police officer, or programs that operated
similarly to CAHOOTS (White Bird Clinic, n.d.). Crisis response teams without a police officer
present may provide greater benefits than the previously discussed methods as an officer’s
presence may increase stigma, criminalization, or instances of trauma in some cases due to
escalation (Watson et al., 2021). As a result, in some cases police involvement may not be
necessary at all, especially in instances where a CRP team could be dispatched to make the first
intervention as an alternative. Watson and other researchers (2021) went on to discuss the ways
in which shifting of responsibility for police officers may occur and suggested that an entirely
new role may need to be implemented for this new method. Here, an emergency psychiatric
technician would be tasked with maintaining collaborative relationships with law enforcement
agencies while also working with care providers who would provide longer-term treatment of
subjects experiencing crisis. This role could easily be implemented through the use of CRPs
whose main purpose would be to address the current experiences of police officers who have
been given the responsibility to act as social workers.
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Conceptual Framework
This need for the reassessment of police responsibilities has been a major focus of the
“defund the police” movement. Maugeri (2020) reiterated that the basic premise of this
movement, while it may cause concern or create controversy, was to lessen the amount of social
work for police officers. It was noted that officers should not be doing the bulk of the work for
those experiencing mental health issues, issues with substance abuse, or any other causes of
concern that would be more appropriate for a mental health specialist or social worker (Maugeri,
2020). Holder and Harris (2020) agreed with this, stating that the majority of 911 calls, 80%
specifically, are made in response to nonviolent or non-property related offenses. Calls regarding
homeless individuals, those experiencing a mental health crisis, and minor complaints are
examples of situations that may be resolved without the use of a police officer’s intervention.
Alternatively, Community Response Programs may work to address this need by serving their
communities and emergency responders. In doing so, police departments may be able to better
utilize the time and efficiency of their officers by re-evaluating their priorities.
By investigating the ways in which other teams without police officers may be utilized in
response to crisis intervention calls, research may also identify ways to increase subject
outcomes or agreeability during such calls. Research regarding subject cooperation and
agreeability as a means of effectiveness has not been conducted thoroughly compared to research
examining officer perceptions of CIT programs and training (Harte, 2015; Seo et al., 2020). In a
similar manner, research by Borum et al. (1998) examined three different models of crisis
response (i.e., police-based response teams, police-based mental health response teams, and
mental health-based response programs with in-house social workers). Participants of all three
models were questioned regarding their satisfaction and opinions regarding their department or
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program’s effectiveness. Even previous research that examined the validity of such programs did
so through the lens of officer self-efficacy, referral decisions and de-escalation skills, and
attitudes towards psychiatric treatment (Broussard et al., 2011). This is important to note as the
majority of prior research conducted regarding CIT and CRT programs have focused on the
perceptions of the officers with a lack of focus on attitudes, satisfaction, and benefits of those
who received aid from these crisis calls (Borum et al., 1998; Compton et al., 2008; Seo et al.,
2020; Young et al., 2008).
When examining the effectiveness of CRT programs, Bonkiewicz et al. (2014) found that
in the six months following an intervention, subjects were less likely to be arrested, were less
likely to be involved in future crisis calls, and the rates of emergency crisis transportation care
decreased. These results, paired with the suggestions from prior research, indicated that
implementation and awareness of such programs may result in a community that is more likely
to identify and reach out for such interventions (Morabito et al., 2013; Seo et al., 2020;). With
this community aspect in mind, however, it is important to further investigate the variety of
reactions subjects hold after experiencing such an intervention. It may also be beneficial to
examine how subjects respond to crisis response teams that differ from traditional CIT or CRT
groups through the exclusion of police officers as suggested by Watson et al. (2021). With this in
mind, CAHOOTS could act as a model program or provide some type of standard or baseline for
the comparison or creation of other such crisis response programs.
Current Study
Overall, prior research has found that CIT and CRT units have been beneficial in
reducing arrest rates, improving officer interactions with those in crisis, and established a need to
further investigate the ways these programs impact these individuals (Bonkiewicz et al., 2014;
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Compton et al., 2008; Morabito et al., 2013; Young et al., 2008). Research also indicated that
community response programs may provide similar benefits without the need for a police officer
present during the initial intervention (Jennings et al., 2015; Watson et al., 2021). However, the
review of current literature identified the need for further investigation on how the differences of
member composition in these teams may influence factors such as arrest rates, as well as subject
agreeability and cooperation. Investigating the composition of these teams, and whether a police
officer is present in particular, may yield significant results that could benefit future
implementation of crisis response intervention strategies.
Based on this, the current study’s purpose was to identify and analyze community
response programs in comparison to the model program criteria set by CAHOOTS. This was
conducted through a content analysis of program websites to examine information and data
available from the programs identified.
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Chapter 3
Methods
Research Design
A program comparison research design was used to collect data and conduct a content
analysis on relevant programs that utilized a crisis intervention response similar to CAHOOTS
(White Bird Clinic, n.d.). As discussed in the literature review, current crisis response methods
were separated into three categories (1 = Crisis Intervention Teams; 2 = Co-Response Teams; 3 =
Community Response Programs). From these categories, programs and organizations that
operated similarly to CAHOOTS were solely investigated as there is a lack of research on this
specific team composition, in comparison to CITs and CRTs as identified from the literature
review.
Sample
Programs that fit the operating criteria as set by CAHOOTS were examined, resulting in
a sample of nine crisis intervention programs that followed similar operating procedures,
intervention styles, and group compositions (White Bird Clinic, n.d.). With CAHOOTS’ model,
programs or organizations that paired police officers with their teams as the default team
composition were excluded as they fell under the category of Co-Response Teams. The lack of
police officer presence in the composition of this team was the determining variable as to
whether programs were included in the following analysis. Programs that worked with police
departments, emergency services, or involved officers after initial interventions had begun were
also included as the intervention was still performed by the CRP originally. If a crime had been
committed during the call, or new information had come to light that led CRP members to be
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required to call for police assistance, these groups were still included in the analysis for the same
reasoning.
Instruments
Criteria
Programs investigated had to be approved or involved in some way with police or
emergency services. Intervention programs that were entirely removed from police do not solve
or address the problem of police time and resources. Thus, only programs that worked with
police and emergency services to some extent were considered. To follow a similar structure of
CAHOOTS (White Bird Clinic, n.d.), teams of nurses, EMTs, mental health specialists, social
workers, or other qualified individuals who were not police officers were preferred. To be
included in the current study’s sample, intervention teams could not have a police officer present
or act as a member of the team during the initial intervention. Programs that operated with both a
CRT model and a CRP model were included for evaluation as they followed similar operating
procedures as the model program to some degree. However, it was noted during the collection
process which programs operated under a single intervention model or employed multiple.
Search Parameters
Google was used as the primary search engine to investigate and identify crisis
intervention or response programs that were similar to CAHOOTS (White Bird Clinic, n.d.). The
specific terms used to search for such programs included some variation of crisis response
teams, mental health response teams, alternative policing, mobile crisis response units, and so
on, with the use of other variations of terms and phrases (see Appendix A).
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Procedures
A list of nine programs that fit the CRP criteria was created. These programs identified
were then subject to a content analysis in order to compare them to the CAHOOTS model (White
Bird Clinic, n.d.). From these programs and their websites, key variables were identified and
organized into multiple categories. These included the program name, description, location, team
composition, and values or mission statements of each program (see Appendix B). Available
information regarding dispatch data, the number of calls the program received in any given
amount of time, and a list or description of services provided by the program were also noted
(see Appendix B). After identification and categorization of key variables from each program
was completed, a content analysis comparing these variables was conducted. This was done by
formatting categories into a list and chart to easily compare relevant program information for
similarities and differences.
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Chapter 4
Results
Locations
A total of nine Community Response Programs across the United States (US) that
operated similarly to CAHOOTS and met the needed criteria for the study were examined. There
were three in the West Coast areas, which included the Crisis Now Framework in Alaska; the
Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program in Seattle, Washington; and the Portland
Street Response Program in Oregon (Alaska Mental Health Trust, n.d.; King County, n.d.-b;
Portland Street Response, n.d.). In Alaska, the Crisis Now Framework operated in three different
locations: Anchorage, Matanuska-Susitna Valley, and Fairbanks (Alaska Behavioral Health,
n.d.). In the general western region of the US, the Support Team Assisted Response (STAR)
program operated in Denver, Colorado (Denver Justice Project, 2020).
There were three programs investigated from the Southern US areas which included
Integral Care’s (Expanded) Mobile Crisis Outreach Team (MCOT/EMCOT) in Austin, Texas;
the Mobile Crisis Services program in Knoxville, Tennessee; and the Mobile Crisis Response
Team (MCRT) of Pinellas, Florida (Integral Care, n.d.-b; Personal Enrichment Through Mental
Health Services [PEMHS], n.d.; Tennessee Department of Mental Health & Substance Abuse
Services [TDMHSAS], 2017).
Regarding the Eastern US, there was the Connecticut State’s Department of Mental
Health and Addiction Services (CDMHAS, n.d.). Specific departments and locations were not
included as separate programs as many of the program websites contained very little or vague
information that did not fit in with the criteria of the study. There was also the Mental Health
Center of Greater Manchester’s Mobile Crisis Response Team (MCRT, n.d.), which worked
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under the New Hampshire (NH) Rapid Response department (Seney, 2017). Overall, the
programs investigated were located in a variety of states across the US and were not from one
specific area.
Program Descriptions
Community Response Description
Of the nine programs examined, five were described as some variation of a mobile crisis
response team: CDMHAS, the Portland Street Response Program, Manchester’s MCRT/NH
Rapid Response, Florida’s MCRT, and Alaska’s Crisis Now Framework. These five were
categorized separately from the other mobile crisis response teams as they did not describe their
programs as a type of Co-Response method with police officers present, similar to CAHOOTS.
However, it should be noted that even if these programs were not described as a Co-Response
approach, many of them did utilize this approach at times, which will be discussed later.
In particular, CDMHAS (n.d.) was described as a short-term, statewide services program
that used teams to provide immediate assistance to those who were in crisis or experiencing
distress. This was done so by meeting each individual’s needs during interventions and by
providing appropriate services. On a similar scale, Alaska’s Crisis Now Framework was
described as a 24-hour mobile crisis team across the state and was referred to as the Behavioral
Health Crisis Response through the Crisis Now program (Alaska Behavioral Health, n.d.;
Williams, 2021). It was described as a community-based intervention to provide care in a less
restrictive manner than would typically be found in emergency rooms or with law enforcement
(Alaska Mental Health Trust, n.d.).
Similarly, Manchester’s MCRT/NH Rapid Response program was also described as a
mobile crisis response unit that would dispatch health care workers for mental health crises
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exclusively (the Mental Health Center of Greater Manchester, n.d.). However, this program
differed from the others in that it did not respond to issues involving homelessness or drug use
(Haime, 2020). In contrast, both the STAR program and the Portland Street Response Program
responded to calls involving homelessness and drug use (Mental Health Center of Denver, n.d.;
Portland Street Response, n.d.). The STAR program was described as a mobile crisis response
for mental health crises, depression, substance use issues, poverty, and homelessness specifically
(Denver Justice Project, 2020). Similarly, the Portland Street Response Program was located
within the Portland Fire and Rescue Department with an aim to assist those who were
experiencing mental health or behavioral issues (Portland Street Response, n.d.).
Partial Co-Response Description
While Texas’ MCOT/EMCOT and Knoxville’s Mobile Crisis Services programs were
both described as mobile response teams, Co-Response methods were also included in the
program descriptions (Hepburn, 2021; TDMHSAS, n.d.-a). While this did not exclude them from
the analysis, as they still met the criteria discussed earlier, for ease of access of information and
program types, they were categorized separately from the other programs. Texas’
MCOT/EMCOT program was described as a dispatch response and services referral with CRTs
for psychiatric crises. The program worked with medical services, Austin Police Department,
and Travis County Sheriff’s Office, which allowed for these services to request MCOT/EMCOT
response through the 911 call center (Hepburn, 2021). In comparison, Knoxville’s Mobile Crisis
Services program provided CIT training for all officers, but also had a mobile crisis unit
available to act as a CRP or CRT with an officer (TDMHSAS, n.d.-b).
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Indistinct Description
The two final programs examined, while also partially described as mobile crisis
response unit, were somewhat unclear in their program descriptions or described served
populations different than that of CAHOOTS. The programs were LEAD in King County,
Seattle, and Florida’s MCRT (King County, n.d.-b; PEMHS, n.d.). LEAD was somewhat unclear
on if it performed or acted as a mobile crisis unit to any degree and was instead described as a
diversion program (King County, n.d.-a). It utilized community support to provide officers with
an alternative to traditional arrest and booking for individuals with the use of assigned case
managers. In comparison, Florida’s MCRT was described as a mobile crisis response unit
through the program’s name, but was further referred to as an on-demand crisis intervention
program that served children and young adults specifically (PEMHS, n.d.). In this program, crisis
situations were triaged and screened first by a phone response team, and a crisis unit could be
dispatched if deemed appropriate afterwards.
Team Compositions
Of the nine programs analyzed, five stated that they explicitly operated in teams without
a police officer present as a first option. These programs included STAR, CDMHAS, Portland
Street Response Program, Florida’s MCRT, and Alaska’s Crisis Now Framework. However,
many of these programs did state that if circumstances required the intervention of a police
officer or other emergency services, they would be contacted after the initial intervention and
arrival. This is consistent with CAHOOTS’ approach and thus, these programs were considered
to operate the closest to the model program.
The other four programs that operated with variations in team composition included
LEAD, Texas’ MCOT/EMCOT, Knoxville’s Mobile Crisis Services program, and Manchester’s
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MCRT/NH Rapid Response (LEAD National Support Bureau, n.d.-b). Specifically, these
utilized both CRT approaches where police officers responded with the team, as well as CRPs
where there was no police officer present (King County, n.d.-c; Integral Care, n.d.-b;
TDMHSAS, 2021).
Program Statements
Program websites were investigated to find if there were any explicitly stated mission,
value, or vision statements. These were studied as these statements can provide clarity and
establish clear goals and expectations for these programs. The programs were separated into one
of three categories: statements were clearly provided; statements were vaguely listed as goals or
were provided through a larger organization; or no statements were provided. To be considered
vague, statements either had to be difficult to find on the program website, through redirected
links, or did not use any keywords including mission, value, or vision. Project goals or objectives
may have been listed instead. From these categories, two programs had clear mission, value, or
vision statements, which included Seattle’s LEAD program; and Connecticut’s DMHAS. The
LEAD program’s statements were not immediately available through the description page, and
the hyperlinks available led to multiple expired links or non-functioning websites (LEAD
National Support Bureau, n.d.-a). However, statements were provided by King County’s
Diversion and Reentry Services (n.d.-a). As this was located on the same website under the same
organization, the LEAD program was still placed into the ‘statements were clearly provided’
category. The other program that listed clear and specific value statements was CDMHAS (n.d.).
As the two programs that provided clear statements regarding their purpose and intention, they
both iterated a focus on: continuous and follow-up support, prevention of crisis situations,
increasing community relationships, and building strong connections for those in crisis.
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In comparison to LEAD and CDMHAS, there were six programs that had vaguely listed
goals, or statements that were otherwise provided through a larger organization. This included
MCOT/EMCOT, Knoxville’s Mobile Crisis Services program, STAR, Portland Street Response
Program, MCRT in Florida, and Alaska’s Crisis Now Framework. Many of these goals were not
directly stated on their websites and were instead found through other means, such as hyperlinks,
redirects to other websites, videos, or through informational flyers. MCOT/EMCOT, Knoxville’s
Mobile Crisis Services program, and STAR listed goals or objectives through website redirects
to larger organizations or different state websites (Integral Care, n.d.-a; Mental Health Center of
Denver, n.d.; TDMHSAS, n.d.-c). MCRT in Florida stated their intentions through a video linked
on their main website; Alaska’s Crisis Now Framework described their core principles in a
hyperlinked informational flyer; and the Portland Street Response Program had vague goals
listed on their direct website, but were not explicitly stated as such (Alaska Mental Health Trust,
n.d.; PEMHS, n.d.; Portland Street Response Program, n.d.).
For the third category, there was only one program that did not clearly provide any
mission, value, or vision statements through any means. This program was Manchester’s
MCRT/NH Rapid Response program (The Mental Health Center of Greater Manchester, n.d.).
Dispatch Data Availability
Availability and access of data regarding the programs, such as how many calls they had
received or responded to, was also investigated. This was done as transparency and access to
information regarding the status of these programs may be beneficial in improving reputation
and increasing community outreach. For some programs, information was not readily available
on their own websites, but had been published elsewhere through interviews, evaluations, or
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other reports. As the information was available through directed links, referrals, or searches,
these programs were categorized as ones that had provided this information.
Data Provided
Of the nine programs that were examined, four programs had data or information
regarding their practices and results, such as the number of calls received, published on their
website or through other means. These included MCOT/EMCOT, STAR, the Portland Street
Response Program in Oregon, and the MCRT/NH Rapid Response program. MCOT/EMCOT
reported that in 2017, they were dispatched to 3,244 calls crisis intervention calls (Integral Care
Crisis Services, n.d.). More recently, in a nine-month period from December 2019 to September
2020, MCOT/EMCOT had received 944 calls (Hepburn, 2021). In a slightly longer time frame
of 12 months, the Portland Street Response Program (n.d.) responded to 849 calls. This program
also provided a working link to a PSR Dashboard that reported recently updated data through
interactive datasets. These datasets listed number of calls, locations, co-response times,
characteristics of clients, client outcomes, and community insights (Portland Street Response,
2022). This presentation of data closely resembled that which was available through CAHOOTS’
own website where call characteristics and factors were clearly listed.
STAR reported similar data totals to MCOT/EMCOT’s 2019-2020 data set (Denver
Justice Project, 2020). In its first year, STAR reported that they had successfully resolved 1,396
calls without the need for arrests or police intervention, and of those calls, no injuries were
reported (Mental Health Center of Denver, n.d.).
The last program that released data or information to some degree directly was
Manchester’s MCRT/NH Rapid Response program. Through one source, it was reported that the
program responded up to 80 different individuals every week (Seney, 2017). From another
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source, it was reported that in two years, the program responded to a total of 8,146 calls. From
this total, 2,568 of the calls were situations where police referred the individuals to receive an
assessment by the program, and in 1,147 of the calls, police were involved face-to-face with the
team and subject present (Haime, 2020).
Indistinct or Provided by Larger Organization
There were two programs that provided vague information or redirected to a larger
organization, which included LEAD and Knoxville’s Mobile Crisis Services program. Through
the King County website, there was a redirected link to an evaluation of the LEAD program that
had been conducted by the University of Washington; however, the evaluation was focused more
on housing status and outcomes of individuals after participation in the program, not total
referrals or interventions (Clifasefi et al., 2017). While this data can be useful for other types of
analysis regarding program outcomes and effectiveness, it did not yield any information
regarding current intervention practices, dispatch data, or overall number of calls the program
had responded to.
With further investigation, the King County website also redirected to the larger LEAD
program (LEAD National Support Bureau, n.d.-b). Even though the data provided was specific
to the King County location, the information was still found through the larger national LEAD
program. Due to this, the program was not categorized with the four described earlier that
provided specific data on their own websites or through interviews or news reports. On this
separate webpage, an infographic was presented with referral data from the last 12 months, and
whether they were made through arrests, community referrals, or social contacts (LEAD King
County, n.d.). Overall, the majority resulted from community referrals, with social contacts
following as the second most common method. There were consistently low or zero arrest
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diversion referrals made in the last 12 months, with a total of two listed (LEAD King County,
n.d.).
The second program listed was Knoxville’s Mobile Crisis Services. Although there was
no specific data published regarding the mobile unit, there were redirects to Tennessee’s Mental
Health Crisis Services Continuum. Overall, the data from 2021 stated that the state received
128,000 calls and 41% of those calls resulted in dispatch of the mobile crisis unit. Over 72,000
face-to-face assessments were completed; however, what qualified as a completed assessment
was not described (TDMHSAS, 2021).
No Data Available
There was a total of three programs that did not provide any accessible data, whether it
was on their own websites or through other means. This included CDMHAS, Florida’s MCRT,
and Alaska’s Crisis Now Framework.
Provided Services
Services and resources provided by the programs analyzed were compiled into six
categories: assessments; drug or physical health treatments; housing, food, or water; mental
health or crisis counseling; referrals to services and information; and follow-up services (see
Appendix C). A total of seven types of assessments or screening processes were identified.
Assessments as a general service was listed four separate times across the nine programs, which
included both face-to-face and telehealth services. Among the programs, triage and screening
practices were listed twice, and consultation services was only listed once.
For treatment of drug addiction or other physical health ailments, there were six total
services provided. Drug treatments or interventions involving overdoses or intoxication were
listed three times. In regard to non-drug-related treatments, free first aid and free medical care
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services were listed twice. Transportation was the last service described, and was only listed
once. While only listed once, other programs did note elsewhere that sometimes transportation
could occur depending on the circumstances and health needs of the individual. The Portland
Street Response Program (n.d.) in particular transported individuals either to the hospital or other
crisis centers. Somewhat related to physical health needs, housing, food, and water resources
were also noted. In total, there were three listings identified. Housing was listed twice, whereas
food, water, and clothing resources were listed once as a single service.
Mental health or crisis counseling services resulted in 16 listings. Crisis services, which
were carried out through telephone use, were listed seven times across the programs in their
service descriptions. These services reflected direct interventions or applications of crisis support
in some way. One of these types of supports included suicidal interventions, which was only
listed once. Another type of crisis service that was also included in this listing was the
development of plans for the current crisis. This service was included as this was a part of the
initial intervention of crisis support as opposed to a follow-up service.
There were three instances found of counseling support that were not directly stated to be
crisis related. Support in these categories were described as counseling, mental health support,
and mental health assistance. Whether these support types were considered to be crisis services
was not explicitly stated by the programs. Another type of service that was discussed included
referrals that focused strictly on directions to a walk-in crisis center, emergency room services,
or decision to dispatch 911 services. This type of service was only listed once. Along with deescalation, which was listed three times, there were two instances of stabilization of symptoms.
Information regarding symptoms or methods of stabilization were provided.
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Referrals for services and information were listed nine separate times. Of this, five of
them were general referrals for resources or support that varied in terms of specific details. These
were conducted either face-to-face or through telephone services. One of these five programs did
state that referrals were for either medical or behavioral health services. The Manchester
MCRT/NH Rapid Response program stated they provided resources as a service, but these
resources were not specified (the Mental Health Center of Greater Manchester, n.d.). The only
program to list specific telehealth services for psychiatric care was the MCRT program in
Pinellas, Florida (PEMHS, n.d.).
Outpatient services was also listed by one program, while another stated that they
provided education for the development of coping skills regarding mental health issues.
Similarly, CDMHAS listed outreach and education as a service of their mobile crisis teams, but
the specifics of this service were not further explained. The last service referral was from the
STAR program which listed community services as an accessible service.
There were eight instances of follow-up services discussed, where three of them were
simply listed as a single resource with no specific statements as to what these included. In terms
of monitored behavior planning, case management and medication management were both
discussed, whereas rehabilitation skills training and psychosocial rehabilitation were two
different counseling services that were noted.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
Location
The location of the programs examined varied across the US, indicating that there is not
necessarily an unequal amount of crisis response programs in one region over another. However,
some of the programs examined were broad or spread out over the entire state rather than a
single city or location. These programs included Tennessee, Connecticut, and Alaska, which
consisted of programs that spanned across multiple cities or redirected to departments and
programs that operated underneath their model. The Mobile Crisis Services program in
Tennessee was partially housed in Knoxville, but redirected to a state website that listed services
and programs across different counties. This was similar to CDMHAS as the majority of
individual programs or departments regarding crisis response services redirected to the state
website. The Crisis Now Framework in Alaska operated in a similar manner as it had three
separate locations in different cities. In comparison, programs that focused more so on specified
locations included King County’s LEAD; the Portland Street Response Program; STAR in
Denver, Colorado; MCRT in Pinellas, Florida; Travis County’s MCOT/EMCOT in Texas; and
MCRT in Manchester, New Hampshire. However, it is also important to note that the majority of
the programs that served specified areas were part of larger care or health programs, but they
were not statewide.
The intended serviceable location of each program is significant to consider as the type of
model and implementation may differ due to this organizational structure. Programs that operate
in single locations or cities may experience more freedom or autonomy as they operate in a
specified area under their own guidance. In comparison, the last three programs may also
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experience a greater sense of direction as there is a larger model or program in place. In this case,
it may be easier to open more locations under one larger program as opposed to creating
individualized programs per city or area. Local or individualized programs are also important to
consider, such as CAHOOTS, as they may be able to form stronger community bonds through
familiarity and repeated community presence (Holder & Harris, 2020). They may also be able to
make more appropriate decisions based on contextual information regarding their community or
for the specific call they are responding to (Holder & Harris, 2020).
It is also important to note that many of the programs analyzed did not specify an exact
location range or limit for their responses, or at least not in a way that was easily accessible for
the general public. This could pose as a problem for those who may contact these programs or
emergency services in hopes of crisis assistance but may be told they are outside of the
program’s service area. Of course, appropriate referrals, transfers, or supplied resources should
be made in this case to ensure the safety of those in contact. However, some programs,
particularly the Portland Street Response Program (n.d.), did specify location limits. The
program listed its location limits with the explanation that the program was still in its pilot phase.
Program Description and Information
There was a lack of consistency of the program descriptions, general approaches, and
implementation procedures on many of the websites. This included: team composition, target
population, and provided services. Of the nine programs analyzed, five were described as a
mobile crisis response team without using the specific term Co-Response Team (CRT), referring
to approaches where a police officer would be present during the intervention. This exact
definition and description were important to note as the purpose of the current study was to
identify and examine programs that operated similarly to that of CAHOOTS, a mobile response
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team without the presence of police officers. However, as noted earlier, many of these programs
that were not described as a CRT did utilize this approach at times. There were instances of
CRTs, non-police-affiliated response teams, and referrals to the teams made by police officers
after their initial intervention.
The lack of consistency regarding program description is significant to consider when
developing and marketing these programs as it should be clear what approach or method is being
utilized. This should be done in order to increase community transparency and awareness so that
community members are informed on what will occur or who will respond when making these
calls, whether directly through the program or through another dispatch service. This will not
occur in every instance or with every program as the decision of which team will respond will be
up to the dispatcher after screening and triage. If individuals in crisis, or those calling on behalf
others, call these programs directly, they may be more familiar with the team structure and
procedure. This may in turn result in higher rates of agreeability and cooperation through
familiarity and exposure. In this case, these individuals may be better prepared compared to
those who call and have teams dispatched through emergency services. However, it is still very
likely that dispatch services will inform the caller who will be responding in these crisis
situations.
It is also worth noting that the specific composition of the teams examined should be a
point of further focus as the presence of a police officer may greatly impact an individual’s
agreeability or cooperation during an experience of crisis based on their inclusion alone. In one
study (Daggenvoorde et al., 2017), it was noted that when police officers intervened, family
members and individuals in crisis felt as if they were being treated like criminals and reported
some negative experiences. While this may still be the case for some with the CRP approach, a
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team comprised of members who are not in a particular uniform, and are visually nonthreatening, may experience higher levels of cooperation compared to those in police-like
uniforms.
Aside from the programs examined for the current study, there were a significant number
of other crisis response programs utilizing CRT approaches. However, the purpose of the current
study was to identify programs with the CRP approach in order to address reallocation of time
and resources for police officers by decreasing unnecessary responses to calls. As a result, it was
important to identify CRPs that utilized trained teams of individuals to de-escalate and resolve
crises among community members without the use of police officer intervention.
The variation and lack of consistency of program descriptions, as well as information
regarding team composition and approach, was significant and may be due to a lack of clear
program standards. With a larger organization or program in place with clearly defined goals,
program description, team composition, and operating procedures, it may be easier to expand and
operate in different locations, as well as increase awareness among the general population.
However, a set standard may not be the ideal approach for all cities, towns, or locations, as it was
suggested that CAHOOTS’ success may be partially due to the White Bird Clinic’s history and
the community trust it has built up over the years (Holder & Harris, 2020). As such, other
programs may not have the same benefit of support and community awareness and relationships.
However, it is still worth investigating if establishing a core standard to act as a baseline for
these programs would be beneficial in reducing unneeded program variation and lack of
information.
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Program Statements
One further way to increase community awareness and information could be by utilizing
more consistent or clear program mission, value, or vision statements. Only two of the programs
provided clear and direct statements regarding their goals, intent, or purpose. While vague goals
or statements were discussed to some degree for six of the other programs, these were not found
directly on the program websites and were instead found through other searches or redirects to
larger departments or organizations. In this way, access of information was more difficult to
obtain in comparison to King County’s LEAD and CDMHAS, which provided clear purpose
statements. By listing easy to access program goals, this may better ensure that community
members are more familiar with procedures and intentions of these particular programs.
Target Populations
Based on the information analyzed through these programs, there was also a lack of
consistency regarding target populations. Some of the programs examined served homeless
individuals or responded to calls involving homelessness as a criterion. Other programs specified
that they did not respond to any calls involving homeless individuals or crisis due to
homelessness. For reference, most of the individuals CAHOOTS has assisted are homeless
(Eugene Police Crime Analysis Unit, 2020), 29% of calls responded to by the EMCOT/MCOT
program in Texas involved issues of homelessness (DeLaus, 2020), and both STAR and the
Portland Street Response Program (n.d.) listed crises related or due to homelessness as a primary
response. As stated earlier, Manchester’s MCRT/NH Rapid Response program differed greatly
from these programs as it did not respond to issues involving either homelessness or drug use
(Seney, 2017).

CRISIS INTERVENTION PROGRAM ANALYSIS

36

During the analysis, there was another population unrelated to homeless individuals that
was identified. The MCRT program in Pinellas, Florida, differed from the majority of the others
as it was the only one to explicitly state that it only served children and young adults (PEMHS,
n.d.). The other programs generally did not specify a limit or age-range of their target
populations. However, this focus is interesting to consider as the populations these programs
serve, whether they are homeless or in specific age ranges, may greatly affect the procedures,
resources, and types of support they should provide. It may be beneficial for programs to
consider their populations in order to tailor their services appropriately, as a teenager
experiencing crisis may not benefit from the same response method or support systems an adult
homeless individual might require. As the approaches and services may be different, separate
programs, trainings, team composition, and member qualification may also be incredibly varied
and specific per target population.
Services
There was a large overlap found when examining the types of services and resources
provided by the programs. As indicated in the chart, the majority of the programs listed a variety
of mental health supports, crisis counseling, and intervention practices, which was expected (see
Appendix C). Even when considering the less common services stated, such as food or housing
support, service referrals and follow-up services may account for general information and
assistance that would be provided to the individuals in need.
Data Availability
From the nine programs analyzed, just under half provided direct and easy to access data
regarding their procedures, calls, practices, and other relevant information. Of the data that was
provided, dispatch and intervention responses varied from 800 and to over 8000, suggesting a
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strong variation between programs. For example, the Portland Street Response Program (2022)
reported 849 calls in one year, whereas Manchester’s MCRT/NH Rapid Response program
reported through one source a total of 8,146 calls (Haime, 2020). This may be due to a few
factors. The Manchester program data was reported from a two-year time frame, but this still
does not account for the large gap between the two numbers. Serviceable location, however,
might provide better context. While the MCRT/NH Rapid Response program served the larger
Manchester area, the Portland Street Response Program (n.d.) indicated clearly that while it was
in its pilot program phase, it would only be operating in the East Precinct, a significantly smaller
location. However, the large variation in the data regarding response calls is important to
investigate further. It would be beneficial to identify the ways in which these programs may be
able to increase the total response calls while still ensuring efficient and quality treatments and
outcomes for the individuals in need.
Relation to ‘Defund the Police’ Movement
The data collected and analyzed highlighted ways in which these programs may assist or
address the current ‘Defund the Police’ movement that suggests services related to crisis
intervention may be suited to other organizations aside from the police. Overall, despite more
prominent research examining CITs and CRTs (Bailey et al., 2019; Compton et al., 2008; Seo et
al., 2020; Young et al., 2008), the programs utilizing the CRP approach should be further
investigated as a way to reallocate goals of current policing practices. Officers and others alike
have previously discussed their dissatisfaction with the sometimes-revolving door that these
individuals can experience if they are arrested due to a crisis intervention call (Yang et al., 2018;
Compton et al., 2010). Officers and police chiefs have stated previously that even with proper
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CIT training in place, there are still limited funds, resources, and locations dedicated to these
individuals if arrested, and they are often released after a short period of time.
The programs identified and analyzed in the current study aim to address these concerns
and issues by utilizing team approaches that do not inherently depend on the presence, time, and
money associated with having a police officer involved. According to DeLaus (2020), benefits of
these programs included increased budget savings, diversionary care by providing more
appropriate and specialized treatments, and reducing strain and pressure on policing and the
criminal justice system. While the program comparison analysis revealed some inconsistencies
regarding the program descriptions or team composition information, access to data, and target
populations and services, most programs reported a significant call response rate. Specifically,
both STAR and the Manchester MCRT/NH Rapid Response programs reported over 1,000 calls
where police intervention was not needed (Mental Health Center of Denver, n.d.; Haime, 2020)..
Limitations and Solutions
The most prominent limitation for the current study was that data was collected solely
through website analysis with no further contact from the organizations or related parties. As the
information was gathered through online means, there was also a lack of firsthand information
and data recorded through observation by the researcher. However, the information collected can
still be beneficial as it can provide context for what people may find when searching for these
programs in order to receive crisis assistance.
There were also limitations regarding time constraints when searching for and identifying
programs during the data collection period. During this period, there were multiple programs that
were examined and evaluated partially before it was revealed they did not meet the criteria to be
included in the current study. Due to the limited amount of time that was allotted, the sample size
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was likely smaller than it may have been if the data collection period was increased. A longer
time dedicated for data collection would likely address this and result in a larger sample size.
The method of how the data was collected was also another limitation as the researcher read over
multiple websites, and it is possible details may have been missed, misinterpreted, or not found.
One way to address this may be by creating a list of terms and phrases that could be used by a
search program or algorithm to identify frequency of terms on each webpage. This would not be
done solely as the main form of data collection and program evaluation, but could also be used to
ensure that the primary researcher does not miss anything.
The model criteria as derived from CAHOOTS may also be seen as a limitation due to
differences between programs, efficiency, funding, location, and other contextual factors. For
future research, a different model or criteria may be created and utilized to create a general
baseline for comparison purposes so as not to unfairly compare other programs against one that
may receive more support or funding. The current study may have also benefited from a different
type or method of analysis or categorization of themes as the ones utilized may not have
provided as in-depth or significant results in comparison. Employing different categories of
themes, with the use of feedback from other researchers, would increase validity and reliability
of the data that would be collected, and the inferences made.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Implications
As discussed previously, the current study contributes to the field of research that aims to
address and acknowledge possible changes in current policing practices. These changes may
include task and priority evaluation that may result in more collaborative and beneficial
relationships between police departments and community-based programs. While not aptly
named, the ‘Defund the Police’ movement has pushed for such a change and the creation,
implementation, and further examination of community-based programs such as these that may
assist both community members and police officers alike. Maugeri (2020), along with Holder
and Harris (2020), agreed with this, reiterating that most mental health calls police officers
respond to fall under the category of social work; a field in which they are not trained. Further
support and development of such intervention and response programs seek to address this need
and lessen the burden of police officers and those experiencing crisis by providing them with a
dedicated team of individuals trained specifically for crisis intervention.
The findings and application of the current program analysis may also prove beneficial
for funding purposes and future expansion or creation of such programs in other cities and
locations. This may also result in some evaluation and restructuring of current programs, such as
those examined here, in order to increase efficiency and transparency regarding procedures and
operations. As identified earlier, ease of access regarding data, as well as team composition and
plans of procedure for each program were varied, difficult to obtain, or non-existent. Addressing
the areas that were not sufficient or did not meet the criteria as set by the CAHOOTS model in
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this analysis may result in programs that can better assist those in crisis, as well as increase
access to resources and chances of recovery.
Recommendations
The field of research regarding the use and effectiveness of CRPs for crisis intervention
should be greatly expanded. While previous research has examined CIT training for officers and
the use of CRTs, there is substantially less research examining CRPs in comparison. Further
research and examination may result in more efficient programs, which in turn may lessen
responsibilities of police officers while also preventing unnecessary arrests and bookings of
individuals in crisis. Better adapted and implemented programs may be able to ensure these
individuals receive the care and support needed. Doing so may prevent them from being arrested,
decrease unneeded emergency room visits, and reduce costs needed to house and treat these
individuals multiple times if they experience such situations repeatedly without effective
treatment options.
When further investigating and evaluating these community response programs,
researchers should provide ample time to contact multiple programs and speak with team
members or coordinators. Doing so may result in more accurate or up-to-date data to assist with
a better analysis. Researchers should also consider adjusting the search parameters and model
criteria to examine programs more broadly, or focus on referral statistics, arrests, and client
outcomes. These specific variables may be utilized to better test the effectiveness and efficacy of
CRPs in comparison to CRT programs and CITs.
Firsthand observation and data collection from these programs may also provide
researchers with more accurate data directly from the teams while on-call. This method could
provide more precise accounts and reports from the different intervention responses. It would
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also be important for future researchers to consider the use of trained or qualified data collectors
or investigators on these teams. This would be done to ensure that the programs and original
team members are recording data accurately within their own systems, as this has been discussed
in previous literature to be a problem with program validity (Blevins et al., 2014). However,
location, size of program, and community characteristics should also be considered. Strassle
(2019) indicated that with observational research, practical CIT data collection has previously
been difficult for many reasons, especially depending on the location of the program.
Future research may also consider flexibility of program evaluations in response to
community and location characteristics. Rural communities may need longer periods of time
during program evaluation to increase chances for larger samples (Strassle, 2019). As a result,
cities or departments should take population and program procedures into account when
establishing the time frame of evaluations. Analyzing such a program in a short amount of time
may not provide researchers with the appropriate amount of data necessary for an accurate
representation of the results.
More direct methods of future research regarding crisis intervention response models
may also consider creating or implementing a dual-model approach for the purpose of a
comparison analysis. This would allow one program to operate both CRT and CRP model teams
in the same location to provide a more accurate representation of data and program outcomes.
Schedules could be altered after a specific amount of time to adjust for call frequency as they
may be more frequent on certain days of the week or times of day. Alternating schedules of the
two teams would allow for a more accurate comparison of the two models.
Taking this into account, establishing new crisis response programs in other areas for
observation and evaluation may benefit from the use of a standard model in place. A standard or
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more generalized model may provide foundational assistance as well as role clarification and
identification for the multiple departments involved. Previous literature identified the need for
strong interpersonal relationships and cohesive work environments in order to ensure better
collaboration between departments and the programs (Bailey et al., 2018, Harte, 2015, Kirst et
al., 2015).
The targeted populations of each program should also be clearly identified for both the
team and community members to increase transparency and awareness of program goals. While
the majority of the programs examined in the current study assisted similar populations, some
varied in what demographic populations they served, such as excluding homeless individuals or
only treating children or young adults (Mental Health Center of Denver, n.d.; PEMHS, n.d.).
There may be benefit in further investigating if population-specific crisis teams offer some value.
While the current study identified the need to examine team composition on the basis of police
officer intervention, demographic characteristics of the team members may also be important to
examine. Future research could examine how the use of gender, race, and age of the team
members in the community response programs influence response call outcomes. Subject
agreeability or cooperation may differ based on the team composition.
Incorporating these variables in future program creation or analyses may provide
communities with more positive outcomes for those experiencing crisis. By examining the team
composition, program procedures, and availability of information and resources, crisis
interventions may experience higher levels of success and better subject outcomes. With these
improvements and further development of such programs, communities may see an increase in
the health and treatment of its most vulnerable.
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Appendix A
Search Parameters
Crisis response team

Crisis intervention program

Crisis response unit

Crisis intervention team

Mobile crisis response unit

Crisis intervention unit

Mobile crisis team

Alternative policing

Mental health response team

Alternative policing styles

Mental health crisis team

Alternative policing programs

Mental health crisis response

Diversion crisis program

Mental health services

Assisted diversion program

Community based response team

Police crisis intervention
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Appendix B
Program Evaluation
Name:
Description:
Location:
Team Composition:
Value/Mission Statement:
Dispatch Data (Yes/No):
Number of Calls:
Services Provided/Type of Calls:
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Appendix C
Table 1
Services Provided
Drug or
Physical
Health
Treatment: 6
Drug
treatment

Housing,
Food, or
Water: 3

Interventions
and Crisis
Counseling: 16

Assessments
:7

Housing
support

Counseling

Assessments

Intoxication

Food,
water,
clothing

Telephone crisis
services

Screening
and Triage

Free medical
care

Housing
support

Crisis Services

Face-to-face
or Telehealth
assessments

First aid

Crisis
intervention
services

Assessments
and
evaluations

Drug
overdoses

Directions/referr Consultation
al to a walk-in
services
crisis center,
emergency
room, or
dispatch of 911
services

Referral for
medical and
behavioral
health
services

Crisis
planning
strategies and
follow-up
services
(Alaska)

Transportatio
n

Mental health
support

Triage or
screening

Medication
management

Suicidal
interventions

Assessment

Access to
community
services
Outreach and
education
Provide
resources

Psychosocial
Rehabilitatio
n

De-escalation

Referrals to
Services and
Information
:9
Information
for outpatient
services

Follow-up
Services: 8

Telephone
support,
information,
and referrals
Referrals to
other
resources and
supports

Follow-up
services
(Knoxville)

Case
management

Rehabilitatio
n Skills
Training

Provide
Follow-up
information
services
on coping
(Connecticut)
skills for
mental health

Peer support
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(Manchester,
vague)

De-escalation

Mental Health
assistance
Development of
plans for safety
or current crisis
De-escalation
and/or
resolution
Offer supportive
crisis counseling
Providing or
conducting
stabilization
services
Stabilization of
symptoms
Welfare calls
and response for
non-lifethreatening
crisis situations

Telehealth
services for
psychiatric
care

